• 李毅
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发表于: 4/21/2008 05:13 发表主题: 继续讨论
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Don Baker <dbaker@interchange.ubc.ca> Sun, Apr 20, 2008 at 6:19 PM
To: dr.liyi@gmail.com
Dear Dr. Li:

Now that our discussion on H -Asia has been cut off, I thought I would send you a personal email to explain why the reaction to your posts have been so negative.

Besides your obvious lack of solid knowledge of Chinese history (for example,your claim that Tibet was part of China during the Ming dynasty), you come across as an imperialist. Your claim that China today should embrace all the lands that once were part of the Qing empire is what I am talking about. The Soviet empire collapsed a couple of decades ago. That leaves the Chinese empire the only one left standing. History suggests that it won't stand much longer. Moreover, to defend an empire in the 21st century is to identify yourself as a reactionary, out of tune with the modern world. It is hard to convince people what the future should look like when you are living in the past.

You would find a much more congenial response if you, first of all, checked your facts first (you come across in your emails as someone who thinks that his Chinese ancestry gives him the right to tell non-Chinese scholars of Chinese history what the "truth" about Chinese history is). Second, you should tone down your claims to China's imperial rights. You could start by recognizing the reality that, no matter what the legal status of Taiwan is, it clearly is not now, and has not been, a part of China in the same way that Tibet and Xinjiang are. (If you visited Taiwan, you would notice it has its own government, its own army, its own currency, etc. That same cannot be said of Tibet and Xinjiang.)

Sincerely,

Don Baker




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  • 李毅
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发表于: 4/21/2008 05:24 发表主题: 继续讨论
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H-ASIA: Tibet, the 'great game' and the CIA (fwd)

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Frank Conlon <conlon@u.washington.edu> Sun, Apr 20, 2008 at 8:27 AM
Reply-To: H-Net list for Asian History and Culture <H-ASIA@h-net.msu.edu>
To: H-ASIA@h-net.msu.edu
H-ASIA
April 20, 2008

A response on the 'great game', Tibet and the CIA
**********************************************************************
From: Yi Li <dr.liyi@gmail.com>


When I said CIA fanned the 1959 revolt and started a guerrillas war in Tibet
to separate Tibet from China, one editor said what I said is "alleged." What
I said is not alleged. It is the common sense in the field of China studies
and Tibet studies. I already gave the major sources, the several books.


Today, I found this article. "Tibet, the 'great game' and the CIA"
By Richard M Bennett

The author is an expert in the field. Asian Times is the most authoritative English journal in Asia.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JC26Ad02.html


Most sincerely,

Li Yi Ph.D.
Independent Scholar
Culver City, CA
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  • 李毅
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发表于: 4/21/2008 05:33 发表主题: 继续讨论
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Tibet, the great game and the CIA

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Yi Li <dr.liyi@gmail.com> Mon, Apr 21, 2008 at 2:31 AM
To: Flora Sapio <Flora.Sapio@uni-wuerzburg.de>

Dear Dr. Flora Sapio,

Thank you so much for your understanding. I would like to say it again that, no one is wrong here. If I am CIA, I would do the same thing. If I am Mao Zedong and Hu Jintao, I would do the same thing also. This is the reality of human society.

Thank you again.

Most sincerely,

Li Yi Ph.D.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_class#Chinese_model
http://www.socioweb.com/sociology-books/book/0761833315
http://www.univpress.com/ISBN/0761833315
http://www.worldcat.org/ISBN/0761833315
http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/71438053


On 4/20/08, Flora Sapio <Flora.Sapio@uni-wuerzburg.de> wrote:
Dear Yi Li,

thanks a lot for posting the link to the article! We will try to understand what
is going on with Tibet, China and the Olympics during a few seminars at the
university where I am teaching, and I will have my students read this article
(as well as other material) and comment upon it.

I prefer not to get involved in issues that are so politically charged. The
debate can be very sterile at times. However I feel it is necessary to examine
objectively what is going on.

As for my opinion as a person - not as a teacher - about this whole situation,
well..I am looking forward to enjoying the Olympic games.

Cheers,

Flora




--
祺安

李 毅

http://book.danawa.com.cn/book/5377191.html
http://www.sociology.cass.nexx/shxw/zxwz/t20071015_13932.htm
http://www.1488.com/china/Intolaws/LawPoint/22/2006-11/224001.shtml
http://www.lookinto.cn/article.asp?id=3526
http://www.frchina.net/data/personArticle.php?id=5933
http://www.chinaelections.com/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=106296
http://www.sociology.cass.nexx/shxw/zxwz/t20070327_11373.htm
http://www.china1840-1949.com/article/view.asp?id=598
http://www.sociology.cass.cn/shxw/zxwz/P020070516311495461425.pdf
http://www.sachina.edu.cn/Htmldata/longbook/liyi_structure_china/index.html
http://www.frchina.net/person.php?id=234





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  • 李毅
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发表于: 4/29/2008 12:57 发表主题:
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H-ASIA: On the etymology of "brainwashing" (comment)

Ryan Dunch H-ASIA April 28, 2008 On the etymology of "brainwashing" (comment) **********...
Apr 27 (2 days ago)



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H-Net list for Asian History and Culture <H-ASIA@h-net.msu.edu>,
Frank Conlon <conlon@u.washington.edu>,
Andrew Field <adf5@nyu.edu>,
"Linda Dwyer, Independent Scholar>" <dwyer@mail.h-net.msu.edu>,
Ryan Dunch <ryan.dunch@ualberta.ca>,
Kate Brittlebank <kateb5@postoffice.utas.edu.au>
date Apr 29, 2008 9:50 AM
subject Re: H-ASIA: On the etymology of "brainwashing" (comment)
mailed-by gmail.com


Dear All,



There is a very vivid discussion on the "brainwashing" of American Chinese students.



It is in the top one news of today's' New York Times. The title is "Chinese Students in U.S. Fight View of Their Home." The web address is

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/education/29student.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss



This is the paragraph:



"We've been smothered for too long time," said Jasmine Dong, another graduate student who attended the U.S.C. lecture. By that, Ms. Dong did not mean that Chinese students had been repressed or censored by their own government. She meant that the Western news media had not acknowledged the strides China had made or the voices of overseas Chinese. "We are still neglected or misunderstood as either brainwashed or manipulated by the government," she said.


Most sincerely,

Li Yi, Ph.D.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_class#Chinese_model
http://www.socioweb.com/sociology-books/book/0761833315
http://www.univpress.com/ISBN/0761833315
http://www.worldcat.org/ISBN/0761833315
http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/71438053



- Hide quoted text -
On 4/27/08, Ryan Dunch <ryan.dunch@ualberta.ca> wrote:
H-ASIA
April 28, 2008

On the etymology of "brainwashing" (comment)
************************************************************************
From: Linda Dwyer <Lindwyer5@aol.com>

The interpretation that "xinao" was created to help a westerner understand a native term "xi xin ge mian" glossed as "thought reform" makes sense in several aspects.

First, as most on the list know, "xin" is the term for "heart-mind" and has referred to the affective-cognitive way of perception. In Chinese thought traditionally, affect and cognition have been linked--unlike the split in the west between these two sorts of perception. Interestingly, current neuropsychological research is showing that the Chinese heart-mind may be closer to physical reality as it appears that all "knowing" in the brain is linked to affective processes that are linked to attention and memory etc.

However, an informant speaking with a westerner who has little background in Chinese philosophy or culture would have to adapt to the western world view in order to make himself understood. Clearly, "thought" is in the "brain" to a westerner. Therefore, "thought reform" would only make sense as "xinao" if the westerner speaks Chinese or there is an intermediary who is asking the informant to elaborate where a misunderstanding is occurring.



Best,
Linda Dwyer
Adjunct Associate Professor
University of Maryland University College


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  • 李毅
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发表于: 4/30/2008 02:18 发表主题:
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牛剑论坛近日悄然删掉了所有有关犯罪记录。
这几个犯罪分子,虽然卑鄙无耻,倒也还识时务。
看在大家都是中国人的份儿上,这件事儿到此为止。

[/quote]

如果让我判断的话,我觉得他们商业炒作的可能性非常大。对他们来说,把这个发展成上万点击的话题,就是他们的成功。所以恨不恨对他们不是关键问题,一个话题是否能变成争论,争论了有没有人看,能不能带动大家,才是重要的。

你还不算是大鱼的,如果他们能搞到陈冠希到他们网上去吵,那他们的网站就要一夜成名了。你看出这里面的本质问题了吗?进他们圈套的人是倒霉的人,他们是得益人。他们别的不怕,就怕你不理睬他们。所以我判断他们的手段,是以刺激你为目的的,让你越激愤,他们就越成功。[/quote]
  • 李毅
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发表于: 4/30/2008 02:23 发表主题: The Rise of China and the Future of the West
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The Rise of China and the Future of the West
Can the Liberal System Survive?

By G. John Ikenberry
From Foreign Affairs , January/February 2008
________________________________________
Summary: China's rise will inevitably bring the United States' unipolar moment to an end. But that does not necessarily mean a violent power struggle or the overthrow of the Western system. The U.S.-led international order can remain dominant even while integrating a more powerful China -- but only if Washington sets about strengthening that liberal order now.

G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and the author of After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars.

The rise of China will undoubtedly be one of the great dramas of the twenty-first century. China's extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy are already transforming East Asia, and future decades will see even greater increases in Chinese power and influence. But exactly how this drama will play out is an open question. Will China overthrow the existing order or become a part of it? And what, if anything, can the United States do to maintain its position as China rises?
Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order.

That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join.

This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.
As it faces an ascendant China, the United States should remember that its leadership of the Western order allows it to shape the environment in which China will make critical strategic choices. If it wants to preserve this leadership, Washington must work to strengthen the rules and institutions that underpin that order -- making it even easier to join and harder to overturn. U.S. grand strategy should be built around the motto "The road to the East runs through the West." It must sink the roots of this order as deeply as possible, giving China greater incentives for integration than for opposition and increasing the chances that the system will survive even after U.S. relative power has declined.

The United States' "unipolar moment" will inevitably end. If the defining struggle of the twenty-first century is between China and the United States, China will have the advantage. If the defining struggle is between China and a revived Western system, the West will triumph.

TRANSITIONAL ANXIETIES

China is well on its way to becoming a formidable global power. The size of its economy has quadrupled since the launch of market reforms in the late 1970s and, by some estimates, will double again over the next decade. It has become one of the world's major manufacturing centers and consumes roughly a third of the global supply of iron, steel, and coal. It has accumulated massive foreign reserves, worth more than $1 trillion at the end of 2006. China's military spending has increased at an inflation-adjusted rate of over 18 percent a year, and its diplomacy has extended its reach not just in Asia but also in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Indeed, whereas the Soviet Union rivaled the United States as a military competitor only, China is emerging as both a military and an economic rival -- heralding a profound shift in the distribution of global power.

Power transitions are a recurring problem in international relations. As scholars such as Paul Kennedy and Robert Gilpin have described it, world politics has been marked by a succession of powerful states rising up to organize the international system. A powerful state can create and enforce the rules and institutions of a stable global order in which to pursue its interests and security. But nothing lasts forever: long-term changes in the distribution of power give rise to new challenger states, who set off a struggle over the terms of that international order. Rising states want to translate their newly acquired power into greater authority in the global system -- to reshape the rules and institutions in accordance with their own interests. Declining states, in turn, fear their loss of control and worry about the security implications of their weakened position.

These moments are fraught with danger. When a state occupies a commanding position in the international system, neither it nor weaker states have an incentive to change the existing order. But when the power of a challenger state grows and the power of the leading state weakens, a strategic rivalry ensues, and conflict -- perhaps leading to war -- becomes likely. The danger of power transitions is captured most dramatically in the case of late-nineteenth-century Germany. In 1870, the United Kingdom had a three-to-one advantage in economic power over Germany and a significant military advantage as well; by 1903, Germany had pulled ahead in terms of both economic and military power. As Germany unified and grew, so, too, did its dissatisfactions and demands, and as it grew more powerful, it increasingly appeared as a threat to other great powers in Europe, and security competition began. In the strategic realignments that followed, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, formerly enemies, banded together to confront an emerging Germany. The result was a European war. Many observers see this dynamic emerging in U.S.-Chinese relations. "If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades," the realist scholar John Mearsheimer has written, "the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war."

But not all power transitions generate war or overturn the old order. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the United Kingdom ceded authority to the United States without great conflict or even a rupture in relations. From the late 1940s to the early 1990s, Japan's economy grew from the equivalent of five percent of U.S. GDP to the equivalent of over 60 percent of U.S. GDP, and yet Japan never challenged the existing international order.

Clearly, there are different types of power transitions. Some states have seen their economic and geopolitical power grow dramatically and have still accommodated themselves to the existing order. Others have risen up and sought to change it. Some power transitions have led to the breakdown of the old order and the establishment of a new international hierarchy. Others have brought about only limited adjustments in the regional and global system.

A variety of factors determine the way in which power transitions unfold. The nature of the rising state's regime and the degree of its dissatisfaction with the old order are critical: at the end of the nineteenth century, the United States, a liberal country an ocean away from Europe, was better able to embrace the British-centered international order than Germany was. But even more decisive is the character of the international order itself -- for it is the nature of the international order that shapes a rising state's choice between challenging that order and integrating into it.

OPEN ORDER

The postwar Western order is historically unique. Any international order dominated by a powerful state is based on a mix of coercion and consent, but the U.S.-led order is distinctive in that it has been more liberal than imperial -- and so unusually accessible, legitimate, and durable. Its rules and institutions are rooted in, and thus reinforced by, the evolving global forces of democracy and capitalism. It is expansive, with a wide and widening array of participants and stakeholders. It is capable of generating tremendous economic growth and power while also signaling restraint -- all of which make it hard to overturn and easy to join.
It was the explicit intention of the Western order's architects in the 1940s to make that order integrative and expansive. Before the Cold War split the world into competing camps, Franklin Roosevelt sought to create a one-world system managed by cooperative great powers that would rebuild war-ravaged Europe, integrate the defeated states, and establish mechanisms for security cooperation and expansive economic growth. In fact, it was Roosevelt who urged -- over the opposition of Winston Churchill -- that China be included as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The then Australian ambassador to the United States wrote in his diary after his first meeting with Roosevelt during the war, "He said that he had numerous discussions with Winston about China and that he felt that Winston was 40 years behind the times on China and he continually referred to the Chinese as 'Chinks' and 'Chinamen' and he felt that this was very dangerous. He wanted to keep China as a friend because in 40 or 50 years' time China might easily become a very powerful military nation."

Over the next half century, the United States used the system of rules and institutions it had built to good effect. West Germany was bound to its democratic Western European neighbors through the European Coal and Steel Community (and, later, the European Community) and to the United States through the Atlantic security pact; Japan was bound to the United States through an alliance partnership and expanding economic ties. The Bretton Woods meeting in 1944 laid down the monetary and trade rules that facilitated the opening and subsequent flourishing of the world economy -- an astonishing achievement given the ravages of war and the competing interests of the great powers. Additional agreements between the United States, Western Europe, and Japan solidified the open and multilateral character of the postwar world economy. After the onset of the Cold War, the Marshall Plan in Europe and the 1951 security pact between the United States and Japan further integrated the defeated Axis powers into the Western order.

In the final days of the Cold War, this system once again proved remarkably successful. As the Soviet Union declined, the Western order offered a set of rules and institutions that provided Soviet leaders with both reassurances and points of access -- effectively encouraging them to become a part of the system. Moreover, the shared leadership of the order ensured accommodation of the Soviet Union. As the Reagan administration pursued a hard-line policy toward Moscow, the Europeans pursued detente and engagement. For every hard-line "push," there was a moderating "pull," allowing Mikhail Gorbachev to pursue high-risk reforms. On the eve of German unification, the fact that a united Germany would be embedded in European and Atlantic institutions -- rather than becoming an independent great power -- helped reassure Gorbachev that neither German nor Western intentions were hostile. After the Cold War, the Western order once again managed the integration of a new wave of countries, this time from the formerly communist world. Three particular features of the Western order have been critical to this success and longevity.

First, unlike the imperial systems of the past, the Western order is built around rules and norms of nondiscrimination and market openness, creating conditions for rising states to advance their expanding economic and political goals within it. Across history, international orders have varied widely in terms of whether the material benefits that are generated accrue disproportionately to the leading state or are widely shared. In the Western system, the barriers to economic participation are low, and the potential benefits are high. China has already discovered the massive economic returns that are possible by operating within this open-market system.

Second is the coalition-based character of its leadership. Past orders have tended to be dominated by one state. The stakeholders of the current Western order include a coalition of powers arrayed around the United States -- an important distinction. These leading states, most of them advanced liberal democracies, do not always agree, but they are engaged in a continuous process of give-and-take over economics, politics, and security. Power transitions are typically seen as being played out between two countries, a rising state and a declining hegemon, and the order falls as soon as the power balance shifts. But in the current order, the larger aggregation of democratic capitalist states -- and the resulting accumulation of geopolitical power -- shifts the balance in the order's favor.
Third, the postwar Western order has an unusually dense, encompassing, and broadly endorsed system of rules and institutions. Whatever its shortcomings, it is more open and rule-based than any previous order. State sovereignty and the rule of law are not just norms enshrined in the United Nations Charter. They are part of the deep operating logic of the order. To be sure, these norms are evolving, and the United States itself has historically been ambivalent about binding itself to international law and institutions -- and at no time more so than today. But the overall system is dense with multilateral rules and institutions -- global and regional, economic, political, and security-related. These represent one of the great breakthroughs of the postwar era. They have laid the basis for unprecedented levels of cooperation and shared authority over the global system.
The incentives these features create for China to integrate into the liberal international order are reinforced by the changed nature of the international economic environment -- especially the new interdependence driven by technology. The most farsighted Chinese leaders understand that globalization has changed the game and that China accordingly needs strong, prosperous partners around the world. From the United States' perspective, a healthy Chinese economy is vital to the United States and the rest of the world. Technology and the global economic revolution have created a logic of economic relations that is different from the past -- making the political and institutional logic of the current order all the more powerful.

ACCOMMODATING THE RISE

The most important benefit of these features today is that they give the Western order a remarkable capacity to accommodate rising powers. New entrants into the system have ways of gaining status and authority and opportunities to play a role in governing the order. The fact that the United States, China, and other great powers have nuclear weapons also limits the ability of a rising power to overturn the existing order. In the age of nuclear deterrence, great-power war is, thankfully, no longer a mechanism of historical change. War-driven change has been abolished as a historical process.

The Western order's strong framework of rules and institutions is already starting to facilitate Chinese integration. At first, China embraced certain rules and institutions for defensive purposes: protecting its sovereignty and economic interests while seeking to reassure other states of its peaceful intentions by getting involved in regional and global groupings. But as the scholar Marc Lanteigne argues, "What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only is it 'growing up' within a milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country's development of global power status." China, in short, is increasingly working within, rather than outside of, the Western order.

China is already a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a legacy of Roosevelt's determination to build the universal body around diverse great-power leadership. This gives China the same authority and advantages of "great-power exceptionalism" as the other permanent members. The existing global trading system is also valuable to China, and increasingly so. Chinese economic interests are quite congruent with the current global economic system -- a system that is open and loosely institutionalized and that China has enthusiastically embraced and thrived in. State power today is ultimately based on sustained economic growth, and China is well aware that no major state can modernize without integrating into the globalized capitalist system; if a country wants to be a world power, it has no choice but to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). The road to global power, in effect, runs through the Western order and its multilateral economic institutions.

China not only needs continued access to the global capitalist system; it also wants the protections that the system's rules and institutions provide. The WTO's multilateral trade principles and dispute-settlement mechanisms, for example, offer China tools to defend against the threats of discrimination and protectionism that rising economic powers often confront. The evolution of China's policy suggests that Chinese leaders recognize these advantages: as Beijing's growing commitment to economic liberalization has increased the foreign investment and trade China has enjoyed, so has Beijing increasingly embraced global trade rules. It is possible that as China comes to champion the WTO, the support of the more mature Western economies for the WTO will wane. But it is more likely that both the rising and the declining countries will find value in the quasi-legal mechanisms that allow conflicts to be settled or at least diffused.

The existing international economic institutions also offer opportunities for new powers to rise up through their hierarchies. In the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, governance is based on economic shares, which growing countries can translate into greater institutional voice. To be sure, the process of adjustment has been slow. The United States and Europe still dominate the IMF. Washington has a 17 percent voting share (down from 30 percent) -- a controlling amount, because 85 percent approval is needed for action -- and the European Union has a major say in the appointment of ten of the 24 members of the board. But there are growing pressures, notably the need for resources and the need to maintain relevance, that will likely persuade the Western states to admit China into the inner circle of these economic governance institutions. The IMF's existing shareholders, for example, see a bigger role for rising developing countries as necessary to renew the institution and get it through its current crisis of mission. At the IMF's meeting in Singapore in September 2006, they agreed on reforms that will give China, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey a greater voice.

As China sheds its status as a developing country (and therefore as a client of these institutions), it will increasingly be able to act as a patron and stakeholder instead. Leadership in these organizations is not simply a reflection of economic size (the United States has retained its voting share in the IMF even as its economic weight has declined); nonetheless, incremental advancement within them will create important opportunities for China.

POWER SHIFT AND PEACEFUL CHANGE

Seen in this light, the rise of China need not lead to a volcanic struggle with the United States over global rules and leadership. The Western order has the potential to turn the coming power shift into a peaceful change on terms favorable to the United States. But that will only happen if the United States sets about strengthening the existing order. Today, with Washington preoccupied with terrorism and war in the Middle East, rebuilding Western rules and institutions might to some seem to be of only marginal relevance. Many Bush administration officials have been outright hostile to the multilateral, rule-based system that the United States has shaped and led. Such hostility is foolish and dangerous. China will become powerful: it is already on the rise, and the United States' most powerful strategic weapon is the ability to decide what sort of international order will be in place to receive it.

The United States must reinvest in the Western order, reinforcing the features of that order that encourage engagement, integration, and restraint. The more this order binds together capitalist democratic states in deeply rooted institutions; the more open, consensual, and rule-based it is; and the more widely spread its benefits, the more likely it will be that rising powers can and will secure their interests through integration and accommodation rather than through war. And if the Western system offers rules and institutions that benefit the full range of states -- rising and falling, weak and strong, emerging and mature -- its dominance as an international order is all but certain.

The first thing the United States must do is reestablish itself as the foremost supporter of the global system of governance that underpins the Western order. Doing so will first of all facilitate the kind of collective problem solving that makes all countries better off. At the same time, when other countries see the United States using its power to strengthen existing rules and institutions, that power is rendered more legitimate -- and U.S. authority is strengthened. Countries within the West become more inclined to work with, rather than resist, U.S. power, which reinforces the centrality and dominance of the West itself.

Renewing Western rules and institutions will require, among other things, updating the old bargains that underpinned key postwar security pacts. The strategic understanding behind both NATO and Washington's East Asian alliances is that the United States will work with its allies to provide security and bring them in on decisions over the use of force, and U.S. allies, in return, will operate within the U.S.-led Western order. Security cooperation in the West remains extensive today, but with the main security threats less obvious than they were during the Cold War, the purposes and responsibilities of these alliances are under dispute. Accordingly, the United States needs to reaffirm the political value of these alliances -- recognizing that they are part of a wider Western institutional architecture that allows states to do business with one another.

The United States should also renew its support for wide-ranging multilateral institutions. On the economic front, this would include building on the agreements and architecture of the WTO, including pursuing efforts to conclude the current Doha Round of trade talks, which seeks to extend market opportunities and trade liberalization to developing countries. The WTO is at a critical stage. The basic standard of nondiscrimination is at risk thanks to the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements. Meanwhile, there are growing doubts over whether the WTO can in fact carry out trade liberalization, particularly in agriculture, that benefits developing countries. These issues may seem narrow, but the fundamental character of the liberal international order -- its commitment to universal rules of openness that spread gains widely -- is at stake. Similar doubts haunt a host of other multilateral agreements -- on global warming and nuclear nonproliferation, among others -- and they thus also demand renewed U.S. leadership.

The strategy here is not simply to ensure that the Western order is open and rule-based. It is also to make sure that the order does not fragment into an array of bilateral and "minilateral" arrangements, causing the United States to find itself tied to only a few key states in various regions. Under such a scenario, China would have an opportunity to build its own set of bilateral and "minilateral" pacts. As a result, the world would be broken into competing U.S. and Chinese spheres. The more security and economic relations are multilateral and all-encompassing, the more the global system retains its coherence.

In addition to maintaining the openness and durability of the order, the United States must redouble its efforts to integrate rising developing countries into key global institutions. Bringing emerging countries into the governance of the international order will give it new life. The United States and Europe must find room at the table not only for China but also for countries such as Brazil, India, and South Africa. A Goldman Sachs report on the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) noted that by 2050 these countries' economies could together be larger than those of the original G-6 countries (Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) combined. Each international institution presents its own challenges. The UN Security Council is perhaps the hardest to deal with, but its reform would also bring the greatest returns. Less formal bodies -- the so-called G-20 and various other intergovernmental networks -- can provide alternative avenues for voice and representation.

THE TRIUMPH OF THE LIBERAL ORDER

The key thing for U.S. leaders to remember is that it may be possible for China to overtake the United States alone, but it is much less likely that China will ever manage to overtake the Western order. In terms of economic weight, for example, China will surpass the United States as the largest state in the global system sometime around 2020. (Because of its population, China needs a level of productivity only one-fifth that of the United States to become the world's biggest economy.) But when the economic capacity of the Western system as a whole is considered, China's economic advances look much less significant; the Chinese economy will be much smaller than the combined economies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development far into the future. This is even truer of military might: China cannot hope to come anywhere close to total OECD military expenditures anytime soon. The capitalist democratic world is a powerful constituency for the preservation -- and, indeed, extension -- of the existing international order. If China intends to rise up and challenge the existing order, it has a much more daunting task than simply confronting the United States.
The "unipolar moment" will eventually pass. U.S. dominance will eventually end. U.S. grand strategy, accordingly, should be driven by one key question: What kind of international order would the United States like to see in place when it is less powerful?

This might be called the neo-Rawlsian question of the current era. The political philosopher John Rawls argued that political institutions should be conceived behind a "veil of ignorance" -- that is, the architects should design institutions as if they do not know precisely where they will be within a socioeconomic system. The result would be a system that safeguards a person's interests regardless of whether he is rich or poor, weak or strong. The United States needs to take that approach to its leadership of the international order today. It must put in place institutions and fortify rules that will safeguard its interests regardless of where exactly in the hierarchy it is or how exactly power is distributed in 10, 50, or 100 years.

Fortunately, such an order is in place already. The task now is to make it so expansive and so institutionalized that China has no choice but to become a full-fledged member of it. The United States cannot thwart China's rise, but it can help ensure that China's power is exercised within the rules and institutions that the United States and its partners have crafted over the last century, rules and institutions that can protect the interests of all states in the more crowded world of the future. The United States' global position may be weakening, but the international system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty-first century.

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  • 李毅
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发表于: 5/03/2008 09:37 发表主题:
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牛剑论坛又把那些东西贴回来了。
真是树欲静而风不止。
看来shu wenmiao 是想干到底了。

李毅 写到:
牛剑论坛近日悄然删掉了所有有关犯罪记录。
这几个犯罪分子,虽然卑鄙无耻,倒也还识时务。
看在大家都是中国人的份儿上,这件事儿到此为止。



如果让我判断的话,我觉得他们商业炒作的可能性非常大。对他们来说,把这个发展成上万点击的话题,就是他们的成功。所以恨不恨对他们不是关键问题,一个话题是否能变成争论,争论了有没有人看,能不能带动大家,才是重要的。

你还不算是大鱼的,如果他们能搞到陈冠希到他们网上去吵,那他们的网站就要一夜成名了。你看出这里面的本质问题了吗?进他们圈套的人是倒霉的人,他们是得益人。他们别的不怕,就怕你不理睬他们。所以我判断他们的手段,是以刺激你为目的的,让你越激愤,他们就越成功。[/quote][/quote]
  • 李毅
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发表于: 5/14/2008 20:03 发表主题: 中国是怎样崛起的?
引用并回复 快速引用
西方有关研究忽略了一个重大问题:中国是怎样缔造、崛起的?只有中国人能回答。

《复活的将军》是一个良好的开端。


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CCTV-科技频道-复活的军团- [ Translate this page ]大型纪录片《复活的军团》以考古证据和历史研究为依托,借鉴故事片的表现形式,层层揭示秦军之所以能够一统天下的历史真相。该片历时三年,其制作投资在中国纪录片史上 ...
www.cctv.com/science/special/C11712/01/index.shtml - 27k - Cached - Similar pages

复活的军团优酷视频- [ Translate this page ]复活的军团搜索- 优酷网为你提供最为专业全面的复活的军团视频搜索.
so.youku.com/search_video/type_tag_q_复活的军团 - 50k - Cached - Similar pages

专辑:历史纪录片【复活的军团】-新浪播客- [ Translate this page ]历史纪录片【复活的军团】,2000多年前,秦始皇的军队第一次统一了中国大地,也创建了当时世界上最庞大的帝国。大型记录片《复活的军团》以考古证据和历史研究为依托, ...
you.video.sina.com.cn/a/566268-1253585501.html - 40k - Cached - Similar pages

80万秦军的最终下落:续《复活的军团》 |
  • 李毅
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发表于: 5/14/2008 20:05 发表主题: 今日中国的崛起
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今日中国的崛起,始于两场战争:解放战争,朝鲜战争。

关于朝鲜战争,CNN有个三个小时的很好的纪录片。

关于解放战争,大陆现在也有了:

http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2008-04/09/content_7947366.htm
  • 李毅
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发表于: 6/16/2008 14:05 发表主题:
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http://www.wyzxsx.com/zazhi/no.66.htm

中国29年来对外开放、创办“三资”企业的分析研究报告
孙学文
(当代中国研究所研究员)


内容提要

一、中国拿出3.86万平方公里的国土创办各类经济特区
二、外商已控制中国外贸主导权
三、中国外贸依存度迅速上升,已超过所有工业发达国家
四、外商办独资企业越来越成为首选方式
五、外商29年来主要是掌控中国制造业
六、中国给予外商投资者“超国民待遇”
七、外商把绝大部分投向中国东部地区,造成地区差别扩大生产布局畸型化
八、外商控制中国产业、行业、产品和占领中国市场越来越严重
九、外商在华重现资本原始积累的残酷性
十、外资经济占全国总量的比重越来越大

中国29年来招商引资,取得了比邓小平当初设想还要好的成绩:截至2006年底,实际利用外资8826.73亿美元(其中对外借款1471.57亿美元),比建国头29年借用设备贷款额高出62.32倍,比邓小平当初设想多出10.03―16.65倍。全国13亿多人口平均实际利用外资671.5美元。截至2007年7月,中国累计批准外商企业61万多家,实际利用外资7200亿美元。到2006年底,已有27.5万家“三资”企业注册登记或开业投产,在华形成了具体生产力。
中国实际吸收外商直接投资额从1992年以来一直列发展中国家第一位,列世界前四名;中国拿出国土面积和创办各类经济性特区列世界第一位,中国外贸依存度超过8个工业发达国家和发展中大国。
“三资”企业以占2/3外贸额和新增额的比重推动了中国外贸从1978年列世界第27位上升到2006年第3位;目前凡对外开放的行业;产业的前五名,都由外企占据;全国最重要的28个产业,外企在21个(占75%)产业占有控股地位;在39个工业行业中,外企在23个(占59%)行业中占优势地位;外企早在2004年占中国工业总产值比重已达30.2%。2006年工业占1/3的比重。据全国工商联和有关学者发文说,外资经济早在2005年占中国GDP的15―16%,2006年已达18.8%。据统计,2006年仅规模以上工业外企、批零餐饮业和建筑业外企,三业实现利润合计达6641.44亿元,按当年汇率测算,合833.11亿美元,相当于2006年外商对华投资额694.68亿美元的119.9%,即多出19.9%的纯利润;近年来外企每年汇出境外的利润在300亿美元左右;加上外企在2006年有贸易顺差912.89亿美元,仅上述四个行业外企纯利润就达1746亿美元,相.当于1979-2006年外商实际投资额6919亿美元的25.2%,即用不到4年时间仅在上述四个行业就将收回全部投资。据世界银行2006年一项调查,外商在华投资赢利率高达22%,是全球投资回报率最高的地区。
上述既是成绩,有的也是问题,既有积极作用也有负面影响。主要问题有:各类开发区办得太多太滥,大量占用农田;外商已控制中国外贸主导权;外贸依存度过高;外商办独资企业越来越成为首选方式;外商29年来主要是掌控中国制造业;中国给予外商投资者“超国民待遇”;外商投资偏向东部地区,造成地区差别扩大;外商控制中国产业、行业、产品和占领中国市场越来越严重;外企重现资本原始积累状况和外资经济占中国国民经济比重越来越高等问题。
中国利用外资情况:截至2006年底,实际利用外资8826.73亿美元(其中对外借款1471.57亿美元),比建国头29年借用设备贷款139.4亿美元高出62.32倍,比邓小平当初设想引资500―800亿美元多出10.03―16.65倍。全国13亿多人口平均实际利用外资671.5美元。合5353元人民币,这是中国历史上从来没有过的。1979―2006年累计批准“三资”企业594427个,合同外资额14858.7亿美元,外商实际投入额6919亿美元。2006年中国实际吸收外商直接投资694.7亿美元(为28年来最高额),中国自1992年以来每年实际吸收外商直接投资额连续十多年列发展中国家首位,在2002年因美英法等国大幅度减少外资流入而列全球第一位,2006年又退居第四位。
从表1看,截至1998年,外商对华直接投资来源地,主要是港澳台和东南亚华人资本,其次是日本、美国、英国、德国、法国和加拿大、荷兰等工业发达国家跨国公司的资本输出。按20年外商直投额测算,列对华直接投资前十名的是香港特区、日本、美国、台湾省、新加坡、韩国、维尔京群岛、英国、德国、澳门特区;按投资项目排列,列前10名的是:香港特区以17.8922万个列第1名,台湾省以41017个列第2名;美国以26674个列第3名;日本以17602个列第4名,韩国以11179个列第5名;新加坡以7997个列第6名,澳门特区以6164个列第7名;加拿大以3984个列第8名;泰国以2631个列第9名;英国以2324个列第10名。按投资合同额排列,香港特区以2976.28亿美元,占合同总额52%的比重列第1名;美国以465.9亿美元占总额8.14%列第2位;台湾省以404亿美元占总额7.06%列第3位;日本以325.43亿美元占总额5.68%列第4位;新加坡以310.91亿美元列第5位;英属维尔京群岛(据说是资金自由流动地区,是洗钱地区之一,台资有一定比重)以169.77亿美元列第6位;英国以150.55亿美元列第7位;韩国以148.37亿美元列第8位;澳门特区以88.97亿美元列第9位;德国以83.97亿美元列第10位。

表1:1979―1998外商对华直接投资前15位国家(地区)情况

国别 投资项目(个) 比重 位次 投资合同额(亿美元) 比重 位次 实际投资额(亿美元) 比重 位次 资金到位率(%) 位次 平均投资规模(万美元) 位次
总计 324620 100 5724.94 100 2673.12 100 46.7 176.4
香港特区 178922 55.12 1 2976.28 51.99 1 1384.34 51.79 1 46.5 6 166.3 12
日本 17602 5.42 4 325.43 5.68 4 219.12 8.20 2 67.3 1 184.9 8
美国 26674 8.22 3 465.94 8.14 2 214.33 8.02 3 46.0 7 174.7 9
台湾省 41017 12.64 2 404.0 7.06 3 212.65 7.96 4 52.6 3 98.5 15
新加坡 7997 2.46 6 310.91 5.43 5 121.77 4.56 5 39.2 12 388.8 5
韩国 11179 3.44 5 148.37 2.59 8 75.62 2.83 6 50.9 4 132.7 14
维尔京群岛 1536 0.47 13 169.17 2.96 6 67.36 2.52 7 39.8 11 1101.4 1
英国 2324 0.72 10 150.55 2.63 7 65.40 2.45 8 43.4 8 647.8 2
德国 1932 0.60 11 83.97 1.47 10 34.38 1.29 9 40.9 10 434.6 4
澳门特区 6164 1.9 7 88.83 1.55 9 33.28 1.24 10 37.5 13 144.1 13
法国 1473 0.45 14 46.43 0.81 12 26.98 1.01 11 58.1 2 315.2 6
马来西亚 1780 0.55 12 42.81 0.75 14 17.64 0.66 12 41.2 9 240.5 7
加拿大 3984 1.23 8 63.66 1.11 11 17.34 0.65 13 27.2 15 168.2 11
荷兰 646 0.20 15 33.94 0.59 15 16.59 0.62 14 48.9 5 525.4 3
泰国 2631 0.81 9 45.55 0.80 13 16.41 0.61 15 36.0 14 173.1 10
其他 18759 5.78 369.12 .45 149.91 5.61 40.6 196.8

资料来源:外经贸部,转自《中国工商时报》1999年11月22日第6版。
(注:比重与位次及资金到位率,平均投资规模为作者测算。)

从资金到位率来看(指实际投资额占投资合同额的比重),20年来全国。三资”企业平均资金到位率为46.7%,即资金未到位率达53.3%,到1998年尚有3051.82亿美元外商允诺的资金未投进来。其中资金到位率较高的是日本商人,到位率为67.3%;其次是法国商人为58.1%,再次是台湾商人为52.6%,第四是韩国商人为50.9%,第五是荷兰商人为48.9%,香港商人为46.5%。从香港商人开始以下都低于全国平均资金到位率。从平均投资规模来看(指平均每个投资项目拥有投资合同金额数),全国32.46万个“三资”企业项目,合同投资额5724.94亿美元,那么全国平均每个项目投资规模为176.4万美元。投资规模最大的是维尔京群岛,投资项目少(只有1536个,仅列第13位),但投资合同额大(为169.17亿美元,列第6位),因而平均投资规模达1101.4万美元,列第1位;列第2位的是英国为647.8万美元;列第3位的是荷兰为525.4万美元;列第4位的是德国为434.6万美元;列第5位的是新加坡为388.8万美元;列第6位的是法国为315.2万美元;列第7位是马来西亚为240.5万美元;列第8位是日本为184.9万美元;列第9位是美国为174.7万美元;列第10位是泰国为173.1万美元。加拿大以168.2万美元列第11位;香港商人以166.3万美元和澳门商人以144.1万美元分列第12、13位;韩国商人以132
  • 李毅
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发表于: 6/16/2008 14:07 发表主题:
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十、外商经济占全国总量的比重越来越大。
中国28年来对外开放、招商引资取得了辉煌的成绩。截至2006年,中国累计达成利用外资项目59.61万个,合同外资额16680.7亿美元,实际使用外资额8826.73亿美元(其中对外借款1471.6亿美元、吸收外商直接投资6919亿美元),折合成人民币为132975.2亿元和70364.9亿元,为中国历史上空前绝后的创举。将这些引资额平均分摊到全中国现今13.14亿人身上,每人平均利用外资额为10120―671.5美元,折合成80674―5353元人民币。相当于2006年人均GDP16084元(按汇率1美元=7.9718元测算为2017.6美元)的62.9%和33.3%;相当于2006年城镇居民人均年收入11759元的86.1%和45.5%;相当于2006年农民人均年纯收入3587元的2.82―1.49倍。
对外开放另一重头戏是以优惠政策吸引外商来华直接投资办厂设店,举办“三资”企业(指中外合作企业、中外合资企业和外商独资企业),直接形成中国生产力。28年来,中国政府共批准“三资”企业594427个,合同外资额14858.5亿美元,截至2006年底,外商已实际投资的6919亿美元(合55156.6亿元人民币),这些都会使外商在华形成资产或资本。据统计,早在1996年外商实投资金1798亿美元,折合为14949亿元人民币(当年汇率为1美元=8.3142元),已超出当年国有经营性资产12955.7亿元(指进行生产经营活动的企业资产,不包括机关、事业单位的不动产)的8.7%。此后,国有经济一方面每年有数万家破产兼并,一方面每年有数千亿到上万亿元固定资产投资;而外商每年有375-694.7亿美元对华直接投资,因财政部没有公布国有资产的数据,不好将外资与国资进行具体比较,但可以肯定的是,外商资本将比国有经营性资产有更大幅度的超过。据2006年“三资”企业年底注册登记表明:截至2006年底,“三资”企业开业投产的有274863户,占批准户数的46.2%;这些“三资”企业总投资17076亿美元(合136126.5亿元人民币,包括中方少部分投资);注册资本9465亿美元(合75453亿元人民币),其中外方出资7406包美元(合59039.2亿元人民币),外商占开业投产27.9万户“三资”企业的控股比重为78.2%,总体上看是外商控股控权的资本主义私有经济。外商仅占27.5万户“三资”企业就注册资本达7406亿美元,已超出商务部统计的截至2006年外商直投额6919亿美元。
前面已经分析,外商上述投资和建立的“三资”企业已分布在中国一、二、三产业和所有的第三产业各行业。其中外商投资于工业占大部分,办“三资”企业户数19万多家,占整个“三资”企业户数的69.3%,投资占665%,注册资本占66.6%,外方出资占66.3%,都超出总数的2/3的比重。另据2006年城镇分类统计,外商2006年对城镇各行业总投资达9925.3亿元,占全国城镇总投资的10.6%;其中外商对工业投资6115.6亿元,占外商总投资55.6%,仍然是外商投资重点;外商工业投资占全国工业总投资的15.8%.中国政府历来把投资重点放在工业上。据统计,在建国头29年内,工业基建总投资达3434.36亿元,占全国基建投资的54.6%;1979-2000年工业基建总投资达36477.2亿元,占全国基建总投资的39.8%。2006年城镇工业总投资(比基建投资多了一块更新改造投资和新增的房地产开发投资)达38749.2亿元,占城镇总投资的41.5%;2006年工业新增固定资产24805.5亿元,占城镇新增固定资产总额的41.1%。因此就上述意义上说,谁控制和垄断工业;谁就能左右该国经济。还因为第一、第三产业投资额小,见效快,有机构成不高,即使暂时未控制,一旦垄断了生产、产品源头,再控制商品市场就非常容易。前文已经介绍了外商控制各行各业的情况,下面再着重介绍外商占领中国工业情况。
国家统计局从2000年开始只统计规模以上工业企业情况(指年业务收入在500万元以上的大中型工业企业)。2006年外商有工业企业60872户,比1998年增加34430户,平均每年新增4314户,其中2006年比上年新增4485户;外商工业户数占规模以上工业总户数20.2%,比国有及控股企业占8.3%,纯国有工业占5.3%和集体企业占4.9%要高出11.9-15.3个百分点。国有工业户数从1998年64737户减少到2006年24961户,8年因破产兼并减少了39776户,平均每年减少4972户。外企增国企减,一增一减相差74206户。从工业户数增减变化可以看出国企衰退没落、外企兴旺发达和外商兼并国企的进程。2006年在外商工业企业从业人员达2118.1万人,占规模以上工业企业全部从业人数的28.8%;超过国有和控股企业、纯国有企业、集体企业、股份公司、私营企业等所占比重,是占比重最高的经济成分;比1998年增加1342.91万人,年均增加雇工167.9万人。而国有工业职工人数却从1998年3747.8万人减少到2006年1804万人,8年减少1943.8万人,平均每年减少243万人。这一数字包括国有控股公司,占规模以上工业就业总数的24.5%,其中纯国有工业只剩下1111.21万人,比1995年4397万人减少3286万人;减少74.7%,纯国有工人人数仅占全部工业总人数的15.1%,分别比外企低了4.3―13.7个百分点。这种外企增加雇工1342.9万人而国企却减少职工1943.8-3286万人,充分反映了外商和私人老板兼并国有企业,国有职工下岗失业或把中国工人阶级被逼充当资本的雇佣劳动者的进程。从工业总产值来看,外企工业从1980年0.3亿元增到1985年27.1亿元,再增到1999年20078亿元和2004年经济普查时达67137.8亿元,占全国工业总产值的比重从1985年占2.2%上升到1999年占15.9%和2004年占30.2%。2006年规模以上外企创工业总产值达到100076.51亿元,占规模以上工业总产值31.6%,加上规模以下的外企创造的工业总产值预计将占全国工业总产值1/3以上。2006年外企创造工业增加值为25545.8亿元,占规模以上工业增加值的28%。加上规模以下的外企(据2004年经济普查,规模以下的外商工业有4.9万户,雇工236
  • WoJian
  • 注册于:2005-01-19
  • 帖子:13725
发表于: 6/16/2008 16:14 发表主题:
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嗯,数据量挺大,不错。

外资企业的税收管理得如何?金融投资的税收有什么发展方向?
_________________
全世界变暖,原来不是气温更高,而是水分蒸发加快,旱灾水灾雪灾加重,天气大起大伏。

---我见 :)

  • 李毅
  • 注册于:2008-01-15
  • 帖子:818
发表于: 6/21/2008 12:12 发表主题: 长此以往 后果如何?
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目前凡对外开放的行业;产业的前五名,都由外企占据;

全国最重要的28个产业,外企在21个(占75%)产业占有控股地位;

在39个工业行业中,外企在23个(占59%)行业中占优势地位;

外企早在2004年占中国工业总产值比重已达30.2%。

2006年工业占1/3的比重。
  • 李毅
  • 注册于:2008-01-15
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发表于: 8/08/2008 15:36 发表主题: 中国重回世界第一
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人类社会和中国社会走到了一个转折点

今日世界,美国第一,这并非人类社会的常态。秦汉以降两千多年,中国世界第一是人类社会的常态。中国生产总值约占世界三分之一,人口约占世界三分之一,一直是人类先进生产力的代表、人类科技教育的高峰、人类文明的灯塔。两、三百年的罗马帝国,一、两百年的蒙古帝国,都是昙花一现。直到1830年前后,欧洲总产值才超过中国。直到1865年前后,英国总产值才超过中国。直到1900年前后,美国总产值才超过英国。

2007年 GDP
(十亿美元) 人均GDP
(美元)
世界 54,311 7,987
1.美国 13,844 45,845
2.日本 4,384 34,312
3.德国 3,322 40,415
4.中国 3,251 2,461
5.英国 2,773 45,575
6.法国 2,560 41,511
7.意大利 2,105 35,872
8.西班牙 1,439 32,067
9.加拿大 1,432 43,485
10. 巴西  1,314 6,938
11.俄国 1,290 9,075
12.印度  1,099 978
13.韩国 957 19,751
14.澳大利亚 909 43,312
15.墨西哥 893 8,479
资料来源:
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/List-of-countries-by-GDP-(nominal)
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/List-of-countries-by-GDP-%28nominal%29-per-capita
这里只选用了GDP大于墨西哥的国家

2005年,中国总产值成为世界第四。2008年,中国总产值可能超过德国,成为世界第三。再有五年左右时间,中国总产值可能超过日本,成为世界第二。超过日本后,再有二、三十年时间,中国总产值可能超过美国,重回世界第一。中国超过美国之后,有可能长期保持世界第一。如果中国总产值能够如期超过美国并长期保持第一,那么,后代人回过头来看,几千年整个人类社会的历史就是一个基本上中国第一的历史,1865之后这一百多年,就只不过是几千年中国第一的整个人类社会历史的一个小小的插曲、一个变态。我们现在正站在整个人类社会历史的一个十字路口,一个转折点。人类社会能不能从变态转回常态,人类社会历史能不能成为基本上中国第一的历史,就看今后几十年中国人怎么干。
今后二、三十年,中国有三条道路可以走。其一,出一个戈尔巴乔夫,从世界第二掉到世界第十八,土崩瓦解,万劫不复。或者,顺利在五年左右总值超过日本,并在二、三十年之内总值超过美国。即使超过美国,也有两种可能。其一,不能自主创新,变成一个大墨西哥,在经济、军事、政治、文化、教育各方面,成为发达国家的附庸,这就是现在经常讲的拉美化道路。其一,自主创新,社会经济协调发展,全面赶超,在各行各业、各个领域,都能达到世界先进水平,对人类做出较大的贡献,使中国世界第一,成为人类社会的常态。何去何从?在这个人类历史的关键时刻、人类历史的转折点,中国人回顾过去、总结教训、展望未来、认清障碍、明确战略,至关重要。
  • 李毅
  • 注册于:2008-01-15
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发表于: 8/14/2008 00:06 发表主题: 日本今年负增长2.4%
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http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nb20080814a1.html